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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Damages-Income Tax as a Factor in Measuring Personal Injury
Awards
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 specifically excludes from gross
income "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agree-
ment) on account of personal injuries or sickness."'1 Rationally it would
seem that loss of earnings which are included in a personal injury award
should be taxable ;2 but since the code does not by its language exclude
any of the component parts of the award from the exemption it has been
presumed that this replacement of lost earnings is included.3
In personal injury litigation, income tax considerations give rise to at
least two distinct problems. The first is whether plaintiff's gross earnings
or net earnings (after taxes) prior to the injury should be the basis for
determining loss of past and future income in computing the amount of
the damages. The second problem is whether the jury may properly be
reminded in argument, or instructed by the court, that the final award is
not subejct to federal and state income tax.
In resolving the first problem the overwhelming weight of authority
is that the computations must be based on gross income, not net earnings
after income tax payments. The rationale of the cases is that the intro-
duction of the income tax consequences into the case would be too
conjectural and would tend to confuse rather than help the jury in de-
termining the proper amount of damage.4
England for many years was in accord with the American courts in
holding that no deduction for income tax liability should be made from
the amount awarded for loss of earnings.5 This authority has recently
SInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 104 (A) (2). This provision is broad enough to
cover damages for both impariment of earning capacity and past loss of earnings.
2 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 61 (A) as construed by Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426 (1955), includes as gross income any
receipt by the taxpayer that is not specifically excluded by the Code.
' Combs v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Ry. Co., 135 F. Supp.
750 (N. D. Iowa 1955). Another reason that has been given is that since the
verdict is general there is no way to determine the amount apportionable to loss
of earnings so the entire award in practice becomes tax free. See Pfister v. City of
Cleveland, 96 Ohio App. 185, 113 N. E. 2d 366 (1953).
'Rouse v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 349 Ill. App. 139, 110 N. E. 2d
266 (1953); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S. W. 2d 42 (1952);
Pfister v. City of Cleveland, 96 Ohio App. 185, 113 N. E. 2d 366 (1953) ; Smith v.
Pennsylvania Ry. Co., Ohio App., 99 N. E. 2d 501 (1950) ; Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co. v. Curl, 178 F. 2d 497 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Southern Pacific Co. ir. Guthrie, 186 F.
2d 926, 927 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Stokes v. United States, 144 F. 2d 82, 87 (2d Cir.
1944); Runnels v. City of Douglas, 124 F. Supp. 657 (D. C. Alaska 1954);
O'Donnell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 109 F. Supp. 590 (N. D. Cal. 1951) ; Cole v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443, 445 (4th Div. 1945).
aBillingham v. Hughes, (1949), 1 K. B. 643, 9 A. L. R. 311.
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been overruled by Transport Com. v. Gourley.6 Gourley, a civil engineer,
suffered severe injuries while traveling in a railway train operated by the
British Transport Commission. Liability being established, only the
quantum of damages remained to be ascertained. Apart from a provision
for pain and suffering, £37,720 was awarded for loss of earnings, of
which £15,220 was granted for actual loss of earnings before the trial and
£22,500 for estimated future loss of earnings. The judgment (for
£37,720 on account of loss of earnings) made no allowance for any income
tax or surtax which would have been payable by the plaintiff had he re-
ceived it in the ordinary course of his professional activities rather than by
way of damages. The counsel for the defendant requested that the
amount be reduced by the amount of tax plaintiff would have had to pay
if he had earned it, and the request was refused. On appeal the House of
Lords established the amount of unassessed income tax at £30,725 and
upheld the defendant's contention that this should be deducted.
The effect this case will have in the United States remains to be seen.T
The present English view appears to be unsound, at least within the
United States, because the assessment of damages on the basis set out
in the Gourley Case does not lend itself to practical application. Effective
tax rates in the United States fluctuate with the changing of the congress
and are governed by variables such as age, number of dependents, deduc-
tions, extent of the plaintiff's own private fortune, separate income of his
wife if he is married, etc.8 Also, ifi most jurisdictions there is no way
to determine what part of the award is attributable to loss of earnings
as was done in the above English case.
However, to allow no instruction at all as to the income tax con-
sequences may result in an excessive award to the plaintiff through a
misconception on the part of the jury that the award is taxable. This
leads to the second problem which is whether the jury should be told
that the final award is not subject to income tax.
In a recent case, Maus v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co.,9
the plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act 0 against the defendant railroad for personal injuries sustained in the
course of his employment. The defendant requested the court to charge
the jury as follows: "I charge you as a matter of law that by virtue of
the Internal Revenue Act of 1954, any amount received by the plaintiff.
6 (1956) 3 All E. R. 796, 2 Weekly L. R. 41.
Many of the cases cited note 4 supra and note 12 inIra rely on Billingham v.
Hughes in following the view that income tax is of no consequence to the jury,
Is it possible that the Gourley decision may cause American courts to take a new
look at the problem.
' Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S. W. 2d 42 (1952), reversing Hilton.
v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 177, 227 S. W. 2d 675 (1950).
9 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N. E. 2d 253 (1956), affirming Ohio App., 128 N. E. .2d,
166 (1955).
1053 Stat. 1404 (1939) ; 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1953).
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as compensation for personal injury is exempt from federal income taxa-
tion, and you must take this fact into consideration in arriving at the
amount of your verdict in this case." The trial judge refused to give the
charge and he was affirmed on appeal. The court in holding that the
charge should not have been given to the jury based its decision on the
fact that taxation is not a proper factor for the jury to consider because
it introduces an extraneous subject giving rise to conjecture and specula-
tion."
At the time of this writing, thd courts of Arizona, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Texas, and the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa have considered this question. Seven of the
eight jurisdictions held that it is improper to apprise the jury that the
final award is not subject to income tax.'2
In Dempsey v. Thompson,13 the leading case allowing such instruc-
tion, the plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries and the court
held that the defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed that any
amount awarded to the plaintiff was not subject to the income tax.14
The court said, "The present economic conditions are such that most
citizens, most jurors, are not only conscious of, but acutely sensitive to,
the impact of income taxes. Under the Federal and State income tax'
laws of Missouri the net income of all persons is taxable except such as
is specifically exempted. Few persons, other than those who have had
special occasion to learn otherwise, have any knowledge of the exemption
involved in this case. It is reasonable to assume the average juror would
believe the award involved in this case to be subject to such taxes. It
seems clear, therefore, that in order to avoid any harm such a misconcep-
tion could bring about, it would be competent and desirable to instrucf
the jury that an award of damages for personal injuries is not subject to
Federal or State income taxes."' 5
"But see the concurring opinion which states that a charge could be drawn
which if requested should be given by the trial judge.
"Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P. 2d 1034 (1956) ; Atlantic Coastline
Ry. Co. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S. E. 2d 874 (1956); Hall v. Chicago &
North Western Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N. E. 2d 77 (1955), reversing 349 Ill.
App. 175, 110 N. E. 2d 77 (1955) ; Wagner v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 7 Ill. App.
2d 445, 129 N. E. 2d 771 (1955) ; Highshew v. Kushto (nd. Sup. Ct.), 134 N. E.
2d 555 (1956), reversing (nd. App.), 131 N. E. 2d 652 (1956) ; State v. Santry,
160 Ohio St. 164, 113 N. E. 2d-366 (1953) ; Mas v. New York, Chicago & St.
Louis Ry. Co., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N. E. 2d 253 (1956); Missner-Kansas-Texas
Ry. Co. v. McFerrin (Civ. App. Texas), 279 5. W. 2d 410 (1955); Combs v.Chicago, St. Paul, 'Minneapolis and Omaha Ry. Co., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N. D .
Iowa 1955). 
u 
"363 Mo. 339, 251 S. W. 2d 42 (1952), reversing Hilton v. Thompson, 360
Mo. 177, 227 S. W. 2d 675' (1950).
"t The court suggested a proper instruction which is as follows: "You are
instructed that any award made to plaintiff as damages in this case, if any award
is made, is not subject to federal and state income taxes, and you should not con-
sider such taxes in fixing the amonut of any award made to the plaintiff, if any
you make." Id., 346, 251 S. W. 2d at 45.
" Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 'S. W. 2d 42, 45 (1952).
19571
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The purpose in awarding damages in personal injury litigation is to
make the injured party whole. This contemplates that the award for
damages received should place the injured person as nearly as possible in
the condition he would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred.'0
If we apply this principle, it follows that the jury should take the tax
element into consideration in respect to that portion of the recovery which
represents lost earnings, because if the person had not been injured tax
would have been paid on the wages received by him.
The principle that the purpose of a damage award is to make the
injured party whole is not applied by the majority of the courts, however,
when the plaintiff receives benefit from a collateral source. Thus, where
the plaintiff's actual damages are recouped in part by the payments of a
third party, such as continuance of wages by an employer while the
plaintiff is not at work,17 the tortfeasor's liability is not affected by the
amount conferred by the third party upon the injured person.18 By
analogy it would follow that the wrongdoer could not take advantage of
the windfall given the plaintiff by way of a tax benefit.'0 The tortfeasor
cannot be heard to complain of contracts or agreements between the
plaintiff and third parties which would tend to lessen the award if taken
into consideration. The defendant has no interest in whether the plaintiff
must pay the tax or not.
This problem has not as yet been presented to the North Carolina
Supreme Court. If and when this question is put before our court it is
suggested that the better holding is that the jury should not be told of
the income tax exemption. The majority of courts are apparently of
the view that the giving of such an instruction would, in general, not be
in the interest of better judical administration in that the injection of the
question of income tax liability into jury cases would probably give rise
to more problems than it would solve.2 0  North Carolina also follows the
view that the tortfeasor cannot take advantage of contracts and agree-
ments between the plaintiff and third parties which reduce his damage.2'
This would tend to indicate that no such charge should be allowed. 22
EDWIN T. PULLEN
"MCoRmici, DAMAGES § 137 (1935).
"717 Am. JuR., Damages § 200 (1938). See also Hammond v. Shiff, 100 N. C.
161, 6 S. E. 753 (1888) ; where the N. C. court held that collection of insurance
by the plaintiff did not mitigate defendant's damage.
"Majestic v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 147 F. 2d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 1945) ; 1
SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES § 158 (4th ed. 1916); McCoRMicK, DAMAGES § 87, 90(1935).
1" Hall v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N. E. 2d 77(1955); Combs v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Ry. Co., 135 F.
Supp. 750 (N. D. Iowa 1955).
'o See cases cited note 4 supra. 21 See case cited note 17 supra.22 
. C. GEN. STAT. 105-141 (2) exempts from gross income the amount of any
damages received on account of personal injuries. See also Sec. 105 (d) of the
Internal Revenue Code which in effect says that amounts received by an employee
under an employer-financed accident and health plan which constitute wages or
[Vol. 35
